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Abstract
Cognition involves physical stimulation, neural coding, mental
conception, and conscious perception. Beyond the neural coding
of physical stimuli, it is not clear how exactly these component
processes constitute cognition. Within mathematical sciences, cat-
egory theory provides tools such as category, functor, and adjoint-
ness, which are indispensable in the explication of the mathematical
calculations involved in acquiring mathematical knowledge. More
specifically, functorial semantics, in showing that theories and mod-
els can be construed as categories and functors, respectively, and
in establishing the adjointness between abstraction (of theories)
and interpretation (to obtain models), mathematically accounts
for knowing-within-mathematics. Here we show that mathematical
knowing recapitulates – in an elementary form – ordinary cognition.
The process of going from particulars (physical stimuli) to their
concrete models (conscious percepts) via abstract theories (mental
concepts) and measured properties (neural coding) is common to
both mathematical knowing and ordinary cognition. Our investi-
gation of the similarity between knowing-within-mathematics and
knowing-in-general leads us to make a case for the development of
the basic science of cognition in terms of the functorial semantics
of mathematical knowing.
1. Introduction
Our conscious experiences are a means of knowing. As an illustration
consider the following scenario: I know that there is a whiteboard in the
classroom. How did I know? I saw the whiteboard. Conscious perception
of an object, such as this whiteboard, is mediated by the neural coding
of physical stimuli, i.e. sensation. However, there is more to perception
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than all that is given in the sensation (Albright 2015). In the present
example, seeing the whiteboard requires, in addition to the sensation, a
mental concept: whiteboard (Miller 1999). Thus, cognition can be viewed
as a process of knowing that begins with an object and results in knowl-
edge of the object (understood as the ability to distinguish and identify
the object), involving (at least) physical stimuli, neural coding, mental
concepts, and conscious perception. Beyond the neural coding of physical
stimuli, in trying to relate sensation to conception and perception, we
encounter the difficult mind-matter problem. It has been recognized that
this is a theoretical difficulty, and a clear articulation of the difficulty can
facilitate a solution (McGinn 1989, Nagel 1993).
What exactly is the mind-matter problem? Mind is useful in mak-
ing sense of and maneuvering through the material world. In thinking
about things and in making things we think of, we go between the mate-
rial world of things and the mental realm of thoughts with ease. In the
absence of concepts needed for an explicit articulation of the relation be-
tween thoughts and things, the ease with which we go between mind and
matter becomes the difficult mind-matter problem, with the very com-
prehensibility of reality remaining beyond the reach of reason (Einstein
1936, Wigner 1960). The mind-matter problem, at its core, is a problem
of developing the conceptual repertoire needed to relate two (seemingly)
separate universes of discourse or categories: (i) material world, and (ii)
its reflections in the mental realm. It is in this context of relating the two
categories of objective reality and its subjective reflections that we begin
to discern the significance of category theory for providing a scientific ac-
count of the effectiveness of mind in the material world (in the words of
F. William Lawvere, quoted from Picado 2007, p. 25):
Everyday human activities, such as building a house on a hill by a
stream, laying a network of telephone conduits, navigating the solar
system, require plans that can work. Planning any such undertak-
ing requires the development of thinking about space. Each devel-
opment involves many steps of thought and many related geomet-
rical constructions on spaces. Because of the necessary multistep
nature of thinking about space, uniquely mathematical measures
must be taken to make it reliable. Only explicit principles of think-
ing (logic) and explicit principles of space (geometry) can guaran-
tee reliability. The great advance made by the [category] theory
invented 60 years ago by Eilenberg and MacLane (1945) permit-
ted making the principles of logic and geometry explicit; this was
accomplished by discovering the common form of logic and geome-
try so that the principles of the relation between the two are also
explicit. They thereby solved a problem opened 2300 years earlier
by Aristotle with his initial inroads into making explicit the Cate-
gories of Concepts. In the 21st century, their solution is applicable
not only to plane geometry and to medieval syllogisms, but also to
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infinite-dimensional spaces of transformations, to “spaces” of data,
and to other conceptual tools that are applied thousands of times
a day. The form of the principles of both logic and geometry was
discovered by categorists to rest on “naturality” of the transforma-
tions between spaces and the transformations within thought.
In explicating the nature of theories and models of different categories
of mathematical objects, Lawvere (1966) put forward the category of cat-
egories as a foundation for mathematics. Of immediate significance, for
our present purposes, is functorial semantics: the realization that a theory
of a category of mathematical objects is an abstract essence (e.g. a type
of cohesion, a kind of variation) shared by all objects of the category, that
the theory is also a mathematical category, and models are functors in-
terpreting the category embodying the essences (Lawvere 1963, Lawvere
and Rosebrugh 2003, pp. 154f, 235f).1
To better appreciate the reach of functorial semantics, let us note that
experiments do not mechanically lead to theories. Thus, it is extremely
difficult to formulate an explicit mathematical account of scientific the-
orization (Lawvere 2001). This is essentially the problem of developing
a scientific account of science. With individual cognition as “scientific
theorizing writ small” (Fodor 2006, p. 93), the prospects of developing
an explicit science of cognition are apparently bleak: “if God were to tell
us how it [mind] works, none of us would understand Him” (Fodor 2006,
p. 94). Fortunately, with abstract theories as mathematical categories, the
relation between particular objects and general theories is purely math-
ematical, and hence amenable to scientific investigation. In other words,
as an illustration, although we do not have a mathematical account of the
temporal emergence of group theory from rotations, we have, in functo-
rial semantics, “a precise mathematical model for a very general scientific
process of concept formation” (Lawvere 2013a).
Functorial semantics can be said to constitute an elementary form of
ordinary cognition in spelling out the processes involved in mathemati-
cal knowing – going from given particulars to measurements of the given
particulars, to the conceptualization of the particulars based on their mea-
sured properties, to interpretations of the thus formed theories to obtain
models, all together resulting in knowledge (Lawvere 1994). This realiza-
tion is the rationale behind the present in-depth study of the profound re-
semblance between knowing-within-mathematics and knowing-in-general
(Lawvere 2013b).
Mental concepts, which connect physical stimuli to conscious expe-
riences, have been particularly challenging to account for scientifically
(Fodor 1998). Cognitive scientists have long recognized the inadequacy of
1The Appendices to this paper provide mathematical definitions and informal elab-
orations of various category theoretic notions used in the main text.
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the standard model of a concept as a collection of properties: “Just list-
ing properties does not completely specify the knowledge represented in
a concept; people also know about the relations between the properties”
(Smith and Medin 1981, p. 83). Mathematicians have also recognized
that concepts (e.g. graph) cannot be adequately characterized in terms of
the properties alone (Lawvere 2003, Lawvere and Schanuel 2009, p. 380).
This realization led to refining the Fregean “concept is a set [of proper-
ties]” into the present “concept is a [mathematical] category”. Concept,
when modeled as a category, includes not only properties (as objects) but
also their relations (as morphisms; Lawvere 2004; Lawvere and Schanuel
2009, pp. 369f). The basic idea underlying the definition of a mathemat-
ical category is (Lawvere 1991a, p. 1):
A category of objects of thought is not specified until one has spec-
ified the category of maps which transform these objects into one
another and by means of which they can be compared and distin-
guished.
In addition to functorial semantics, sketch theory also provides a math-
ematical account of the relation between mathematical objects and their
descriptions in terms of sketches of structures and prototypes of sketches
(Bastiani and Ehresmann 1972). Grothendieck’s classifying toposes and
descent theory also bear on the core concerns of functorial semantics (Barr
and Wells 2005, pp. 144ff, Clementino and Picado 2008, p. 22). Since our
immediate aim here is to stress the relevance of functorial semantics to
cognition, as originally pointed out by Lawvere (1994), in a manner read-
ily accessible to cognitive neuroscientists, we have limited our discussion
to elaborating functorial semantics.
Thus, we postpone a detailed comparison of functorial semantics with
various models, in contemporary cognitive science, of concept formation
such as the prototype theory of concepts (Rosch and Mervis 1975, see
also Fodor 1998). More importantly, there is a substantial body of cat-
egory theoretic studies of cognition in terms of memory evolutive sys-
tems (Ehresmann and Vanbremeersch 2007), where the binding problem
(Roskies 1999) is modeled as a colimit (Brown and Porter 2003). In our
subsequent work, we plan to discuss memory evolutive systems in order
to further establish the significance of mathematical knowing for more
implicitly developing the science of cognition.
In the following, we provide an accessible category theoretic account of
the mathematics of theorizing and modeling involved in acquiring math-
ematical knowledge. We then elaborate the parallels between ordinary
cognition and mathematical knowing, as seen from the perspective of func-
torial semantics. In closing, we suggest extending the functorial semantics
of knowing-within-mathematics to account for knowing-in-general.
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2. Mathematical Theories and Models
How do we theorize? There are innumerable facts about any given
category of objects. Amongst these facts (expressed as statements), of-
tentimes there is a small number of statements, referred to as a theory,
from which most other true statements can be derived (Lawvere and Rose-
brugh 2003, pp. ix-x). However, the statements constituting a theory are
but a subjective (in the sense of involving arbitrary choices) presentation
of an objective essence (somewhat analogous to the verbal presentation of
a concept in a language) in which all objects of the category partake and
in terms of which every object of the category can be reconstructed or
modeled (Lawvere 2004, p. 8). For example, since every set can be recon-
structed in terms of the basic shape of the single-element set 1 = {•}, and
since any two functions between sets can be distinguished using 1-shaped
figures, a single-element set can be considered as the essence of sets (Law-
vere 1972, p. 135, Lawvere and Schanuel 2009, p. 214, Reyes et al. 2004,
p. 30). Theorizing, or the extraction of essences, can be formalized as
follows.
Given a category A, functors P : A → B can be thought of as prop-
erties of the category A, with values in a category B (cf. Appendix A1,
A2). If we know all these properties, i.e. the functor category BA whose
objects and morphisms are properties and their relations, then we know
all there is to know about A (Lawvere 1994, p. 49). We can take the
totality of properties or the functor category BA as the theory of A.
However, oftentimes we notice that certain properties follow from cer-
tain other properties. So, we can define theory Th(A) of A to be a
subcategory of the functor category BA of all B-valued properties of A,
such that all or most of the properties of A can be accounted for in terms
of the theory Th(A) of A (Lawvere 1994, p. 45). In fact, within the
functor category BA, we have a subcategory with representable functors
R : A → B as objects, which can be taken as the theory Th(A) of the
category A, since any functor on A (any property of A) is a colimit (or
“sum”) of representable functors (Lawvere and Rosebrugh 2003, p. 250).
A simple illustration of the above mathematics of forming mathemat-
ical theories is as follows. Given some rectangular figures, we measure
their properties such as length and width. Comparison of the measured
properties leads to the formation of the concept square, where length and
width are the same. This basic idea of a concept as a relation between
properties can be made more precise and, in the process, shown to underlie
much of mathematical practice.
There are various categories of mathematical objects such as sets, func-
tions, dynamical systems, groups, and graphs (see Fig. 1). Corresponding
to different categories of mathematical objects, mathematical concepts
or theories (e.g. group theory) express the abstract essence of the corre-
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Figure 1: Objects of four mathematical categories: (a) a two-
element set, (b) a function from a single-element set to a two-
element set, (c) a dynamical system with two states, one of which
is an equilibrium state, and (d) a graph consisting of two arrows
with a common target dot.
sponding objects (groups). This mathematical scenario, with particular
objects and their general concepts, resembles the more elaborate scenario
of cognition, wherein we have things and concepts of things expressing
the essence(s) of things. Importantly, the mathematical procedure of ab-
stracting the essence of a given category of mathematical objects thereby
is well understood (Lawvere 2004), and this mathematical understanding
can help clarify more commonplace cognition (Lawvere 1994).
Now we explain the mathematics of going from particulars to gener-
als in terms of graphs (Fig. 1d, Lawvere and Schanuel 2009, pp. 141f,
150f). Let a category G of graphs be the given particulars. A first step
in extracting the essence of the given particulars is the measurement of
properties, such as dots and arrows, of the graphs. A functor
D : G→ S
assigning to each graph X (in the category G) its set XD of dots in the cat-
egory S of sets is one such measurement (Fig. 2, Lawvere 2013a, Lawvere
and Rosebrugh 2003, pp. 236f). This process of measuring dots of graphs
is representable, with a graph D consisting of exactly one dot representing
the dots functor D (Lawvere and Rosebrugh 2003, pp. 248f; the calcula-
tion of objects representing functors is discussed in App. A3). Another
measurement is a set-valued functor
A : G→ S
assigning to each graph X (in G) its set XA of arrows (in S). The arrows
functor A is represented by a graph A consisting of exactly one arrow
(with its source and target dots distinct).
A theory is derived from comparisons of measured properties. With
the measured properties as representable functors D and A, represent-
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Figure 2: Measurements of properties of objects of the category G
of graphs, with values in the category S of sets, are construed as
functors D,A : G → S. The dots functor D : G → S assigns to
each graph in G its set of dots in S, i.e. D(X) = XD and D(Y) =
YD. The arrows functor A : G→ S assigns to each graph in G its
set of arrows in S, i.e. A(X) = XA and A(Y) = YA.
ing graphs D and A along with the graph morphisms between D and A
constitute a theory of graphs. There are two morphisms
s : D→ A
t : D→ A
from the graph D to the graph A (Lawvere and Schanuel 2009, p. 150).
Thus a two-object (graphs D and A) and two-morphism (graph morphisms
s and t) subcategory T of the category G of graphs is a theory of graphs
(Fig. 3). The theory T of graphs can be thought of as the essence of
graphs.
The theory of graphs, i.e. the category T, can be interpreted into a
background category, such as the category S of sets to obtain models. A
model of the theory T is a contravariant functor (see App. A2):
M : T→ S
interpreting the two parallel morphisms s : D → A and t : D → A in the
category T as a parallel pair of functions in the category S of sets:
source : arrows→ dots ,
target : arrows→ dots .
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Figure 3: A theory of graphs is a category T consisting of two
graphs (D, A) and two graph morphisms (s, t : D → A). The
morphisms s, t are inclusions of the dot in graph D as source, target
dot of the arrow in A.
More explicitly, a model of a graph X in G can be constructed based
on the objects and morphisms in the theory T as follows. The set of all
morphisms from the dot graph D (in the theory T) to a graph X is the set
of all dots in the graph X. Similarly, the set of all morphisms from arrow
A (in T) to X is the set of all arrows in X. Any morphism from A to X
can be pre-composed with either one of the two morphisms (s, t : D→ A)
from D to A. Thus we obtain a pair of sets (arrows, dots) equipped with
a parallel pair of functions (source, target), specifying for each arrow (in
the domain set arrows) its source, target dot (in the codomain set dots),
as a model of a graph (Fig. 4).
Theories and models of (categories of) functions, dynamical systems,
groups, and reflexive graphs (treated as particulars) can also be obtained
along the above lines (Fig. 5, Lawvere and Rosebrugh 2003, pp. 154f;
Lawvere and Schanuel 2009, pp. 135ff). The theory of functions consists
of two objects U : 0→ 1 and 1 : 1→ 1 and one morphism U → 1 between
the two objects, where 0 = {} and 1 = {•} (Lawvere and Rosebrugh 2003,
pp. 114ff). The two objects U and 1 of the theory of functions represent
the measurement of codomain and domain, respectively, of functions. A
model of the theory of functions (in the category of sets) is a function
f : X1 → XU from a domain set X1 to a codomain set XU.
The theory of dynamical systems consists of one object (N, n : N→ N)
and one morphism (n : N→ N), where N = {0, 1, 2, ...} and n(n) = n + 1.
The object (N, n : N→ N) of the theory of dynamical systems represents
the measurement of states of dynamical systems (Lawvere and Schanuel
2009, pp. 177ff). A model of the theory of dynamical systems is a set
of states equipped with an endomap. The theory of groups has one ob-
ject (Z, z : Z → Z) and one invertible endomorphism (z : Z → Z), where
Z = {...,−1, 0, 1, ...} and z(z) = z + 1 satisfying z ◦ z′ = z′ ◦ z = 1Z with
z′(z) = z− 1 and ◦ denotes the composition of morphisms (Lawvere and
Rosebrugh 2003, p. 24). Models of the group theory (in the category of
sets) are permutations (Lawvere 1994, p. 55). Both the theories of dynam-
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Figure 4: A graph morphism a : A → X from an object A (in the
theory T of the category G of graphs) to a graph X is an A-shaped
figure in X, and a morphism d : D → X is a D-shaped figure in X.
The set of all morphisms from A to X is the set XA of all arrows
in X, and the set of all morphisms from D to X is the set XD of
all dots in X. Any morphism from A to X can be pre-composed
with a morphism from D to A to obtain a morphism from D to
X. Pre-composing an arrow a : A → X with source s : D → A
gives a morphism from D to X, which is the source dot of the arrow
a : A → X; pre-composing with target t : D → A gives the target
dot. Thus we obtain a parallel pair of functions sx, tx : XA → XD,
specifying for each arrow (in the set XA of arrows) its source, target
dot (in the set XD of dots), as a model of the graph X in the category
S of sets.
ical systems and of groups consist of one object and one endomorphism
on the only object. The only endomorphism in the theory of groups is re-
quired to be invertible, while that in the theory of dynamical systems need
not satisfy any additional conditions besides being an endomorphism.
The theory of reflexive graphs is a category consisting of two graphs
(point P and arrow A) and three graph morphisms (s, t : P→ A, r : A→
P), where morphism r is the common retraction of both source s and
target t, i.e. r ◦ s = r ◦ t = 1P (Lawvere 1994, pp. 46f). The objects P and
A of the theory of reflexive graphs represent the measurement of points
and arrows, respectively, of reflexive graphs. A model of the theory of
reflexive graphs (in the category of sets) is a pair of sets equipped with
three functions (f, g, i) such that the function i is the common section
of the functions f and g, i.e. f ◦ i = g ◦ i = 1. Broadly, theories can
be construed as subcategories of the category of models, and models are
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Figure 5: (a) The theory of functions consists of two functions
U : 0 → 1 and 1 : 1 → 1 along with the morphism U → 1 . (b)
The theory of dynamical systems has one object (N, n : N → N)
and one endomorphism (n : N → N), where N = {0, 1, 2, ...} and
n(n) = n + 1. (c) The theory of groups has one object (Z, z :
Z → Z) and one invertible endomorphism (z : Z → Z), where
Z = {...,−1, 0, 1, ...} and z(z) = z + 1. (d) The theory of reflexive
graphs consists of two graphs (P, A) and three graph morphisms
(s, t : P→ A, r : A→ P), where r is the common retraction of both
s and t.
contravariant functors from the theory to a background category (Lawvere
2004, p. 19). Within this mathematical framework, a theory of a thing is
a part of the thing (e.g. graph theory is a subcategory of the category of
graphs). This is the quintessence of the mathematical method of trying
to find the part of a thing that determines everything about the thing
(Lawvere 1972, p. iv, 9f).
3. Functorial Semantics for Cognition
Substantial progress has been made in characterizing the neural cod-
ing of physical stimuli and in identifying the neural correlates of conscious
experiences (Albright et al. 2000). However, we still do not have a com-
prehensive scientific account of cognition (Fodor 2006). It is not clear how
to go from the neural measures of physical properties of given objects to
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their representations in mind and consciousness, not to mention their ex-
pression in language. Certainly, we are in need of a deep insight into
cognition. Mathematics can enable us to define this insight as the science
of cognition. Recognizing that both cognition and mathematics are about
knowing, we look at how we acquire mathematical knowledge and use its
characteristics to illuminate and develop the field of cognition. For exam-
ple, as we have just seen, with graphs as given particulars, we measure
properties (e.g. set of dots, set of arrows) of the given graphs (Figs. 1d, 2).
Based on comparisons of these measured properties, a theory of graphs
is formed (Fig. 3). Interpreting the theory into a background (e.g. sets)
yields models of the given particulars (Fig. 4).
Correspondences between knowing-within-mathematics and knowing-
in-general can be understood as follows. Looking at given stimuli results
in neural sensations; a mental concept of the given stimuli results from
comparisons of sensations; interpreting the thus formed mental concept (of
the given stimuli) into consciousness (background) results in perception
(of the stimuli). In drawing parallels between
stimuli− sensations− concepts− percepts
and
particulars− properties− theories−models
of cognitive neuroscience and mathematical sciences, respectively, we see
the profound resemblance between mathematical knowing and ordinary
cognition. The process of abstracting theories (mental concepts) from
particulars (physical stimuli) via measurement of properties (neural cod-
ing) and interpreting theories to obtain models (conscious percepts) is
common to both mathematical knowing and ordinary cognition.
In the light of this correspondence, functorial semantics constitutes
a unifying framework within which all four categories – physics, brain,
mind, and consciousness – can be conceptualized as a coherent whole
without having to reduce one into any other. More explicitly, the physical
world, brain, mind, and consciousness are conceptualized as four mathe-
matical categories corresponding to physical stimuli, neural codes, men-
tal concepts, and conscious percepts, respectively, and their relationships
(measurement, abstraction, and interpretation) as functors between these
categories.
Although the physical world, brain, mind, and consciousness are all
formalized as categories, the brain (by virtue of being a category of mea-
surements of the category of physical world) is a higher-order category
with functors on the world as objects. Along these lines, mind (by virtue
of being a category with comparisons of measured properties as objects)
and consciousness (by virtue of being a category of interpretations of
172 Posina, Ghista and Roy
the objects and morphisms of the mind) are endowed with increasingly
higher-order structure.
By elucidating the common elemental form of cognition, functorial se-
mantics can provide an overarching mathematical framework within which
the relation between not only things and thoughts, but also between men-
tal concepts and conscious percepts can be formalized. By comparing
mental concepts to (mathematical) theories and conscious percepts to
(mathematical) models, we can put forward adjointness, a specific form
of interdependence, as the relation between concepts and percepts (see
App. A4). Note that within this framework, unlike the supposed oppo-
sition syntax versus semantics, the opposition is between abstraction (of
general concepts from particulars) and interpretation (of abstract theo-
ries to obtain concrete models; Lawvere 2004, pp. 8, 16; see also Lawvere
2002, 2006, 2010). Moreover, likening words (needed to communicate
concepts) to presentations of theories (needed to calculate), the mathe-
matical relationship between theory, semantics (of models), and syntax
(of presentations) can be used to clarify the totality of cognition: stimuli
– sensations – concepts – percepts – words.
One immediate theoretical implication of the above idealization of cog-
nition is with regard to the nature of the objective logic of cognition, which
is the logic intrinsic to the universe of discourse of cognition (as idealized).
The logic of cognition, when modeled as a four-stage process that begins
with physical stimuli and results in the conscious perception of stimuli
via neural coding and mental concepts, is richer than the Boolean logic
of sets (cf. Fig. 6).
Firstly, let us note that the objective logic of a category is embodied
in its truth value object (Lawvere and Schanuel 2009, pp. 342ff, 352ff),
which can be calculated in terms of the theoretical essences of the category.
The truth value object of the category of sets is a two-element set ΩS =
{false, true}, which corresponds to the two parts (0 = {},1 = {•}) of
the essence 1 = {•} of the category of sets (Reyes et al. 2004, pp. 93ff).
The logical operations of negation, conjunction, and disjunction can be
characterized in terms of the truth value object. For example, negation is
an endomap not: ΩS → ΩS, with ΩS(false) = true, ΩS(true) = false.
Now, as a first approximation, one may identify the cognition of an
object with the end-result of a percept modeled as a set of features, for
instance: moon = {round, white}. With percepts modeled as sets, the
logic of percepts is the Boolean logic of sets. Modeling perception as
a measurement of physical stimuli is somewhat more realistic. When
percepts are modeled as functions f : A → B, their truth-value object
has an intermediate truth value between “false” and “true” (Lawvere and
Rosebrugh 2003, p. 117).
Nevertheless, various extra-sensory influences on perception have high-
lighted the inadequacies of the measurement-device conception of percep-
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Figure 6: (a) The truth-value object of the category of sets is a
two-element set ΩS = {false, true}. (b) The truth-value object of
the category of functions is a function ΩM whose internal diagram
is shown. There is a global truth value “u” in between false (“f”)
and true (“t”). (c) The truth-value object ΩI of the category of
two sequential functions admits two intermediate truth values “u”
and “v”. (d) The truth-value object ΩC of the category of three
sequential functions has five degrees of truth.
tion (Mausfeld 2002), which has led to the contemporary understanding of
perception as involving a process of interpretation in addition to measure-
ment (Albright 2015). Thus, two sequential functions A−f → B−g → C
objectifying interpretation after measurement constitute a closer approx-
imation, and the corresponding category admits four global truth values
(Linton 2004). Our model involving measurement (of properties) followed
by abstraction (of concepts) followed by interpretation (giving rise to per-
cepts) is a further refinement. The resulting category of three sequential
functions A− f → B− g → C− h→ D has a truth-value object with five
degrees of truth globally.
In addition to the degrees of truth, the logic of cognition, even at
the level of a single process of measurement, admits varieties of negation
174 Posina, Ghista and Roy
(not, non; Lawvere 1986, 1991b) and contradiction (i.e., X and non-X
6= 0; Lawvere 1994, p. 48; Lawvere and Rosebrugh 2003, p. 201). Let
us note that the processes of sensation, abstraction, and interpretation
are much more structured than mere functions. The above simplification
is intended to indicate the possibility of calculating the objective logic
of cognition. We are investigating the differences between Boolean logic
and the logic of cognition (realistically objectified) in greater detail, so as
to evaluate real-world situations along the lines of the recent fascinating
applications of quantum logic to cognitive science (Roy 2016).
4. Discussion
Mathematics is a time-tested method of knowing. As such, the mathe-
matics of acquiring mathematical knowledge, i.e. functorial semantics, can
be used to gain insights into the more elaborate ordinary cognition. Sher-
rington’s recognition of neurons (weighted summation of synaptic inputs,
i.e. dot product) as an elementary form of the integrative action of the
brain paved the way for awe-inspiring progress in neuroscience (Albright
et al. 2000, p. S3). In a similar vein, recognizing functorial semantics as
an elementary form of cognition can help us put in place the needed foun-
dations for the advancement of the science of knowing (Lawvere 1994).
However, understanding examples such as cohomology, in terms of
which functorial semantics is motivated, requires decades of mathemati-
cal training. As a result, the relevance of functorial semantics to cognitive
science remains to be appreciated. One of the main objectives of our paper
is to present functorial semantics in a manner accessible to working cog-
nitive neuroscientists. Herein, we have introduced functorial semantics by
using the category of graphs, which is relatively easy to understand. Us-
ing elementary categories to introduce functorial semantics has allowed us
to focus on the mathematics of knowing: forming mathematical concepts
(based on measured properties) of the given particulars, and interpret-
ing the thus formed theory (into a background) to obtain models. Our
approach has been inspired by Lawvere and Schanuel’s (2009) introduc-
tion of category theory via elementary categories, which not only made
category theory accessible but also brought out the categorical concepts
implicit in elementary mathematics.
The main conclusion to be drawn from the present exercise is the
significance of knowing-within-mathematics for the study of knowing-in-
general, especially with regard to two foundational questions:
1. What is the relation between the material world of things and the
mental realm of thoughts?
2. What is the relation between mental concepts and conscious per-
cepts?
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Our conceptualization of things follows from measurements of the things
under study. For instance, measurement of dots and arrows of graphs led
us to a two-object and two-morphism theory of graphs (Fig. 3). If, instead
of arrows, we measured loops of graphs, then we would have obtained a
two-object and one-morphism category as graph theory. The way we see
things is a consequence of our conceptualization. A model of a graph based
on a two-object and two-morphism theory of graphs can be different from
one based on a two-object and one-morphism graph theory. For example,
from the perspective of two-object and one-morphism graph theory, a
graph with two dots is indistinguishable from a graph with one arrow
(with its source and target dots distinct), since both have zero loops and
two dots.
In light of the kinship between mathematical knowing and ordinary
cognition that we have highlighted, the idea that scientific theorizing
is separate from ordinary cognition (Pinker 2005), which has been put
forth to rationalize the shortcomings of contemporary cognitive science
(Fodor 2001), is untenable. Functorial semantics, with its well-defined
transformations between particulars and generals, can be elaborated from
knowing-within-mathematics (comprised of particulars, measured prop-
erties, abstract theories, and concrete models) to encompass cognition
(comprised of physical stimuli, neural sensations, mental concepts, and
conscious percepts).
This research program involves the investigation of the mathematical
structure of the empirical spaces of physical stimuli, neural codes, mental
concepts, and conscious percepts from the perspective of functorial se-
mantics: (i) construing physical stimuli (e.g. sound, light), neural codes,
mental concepts, and conscious percepts as categories based on their struc-
ture (cf. Balduzzi and Tononi 2009, Clark 1993, Ga¨rdenfors 2004, Stanley
1999, Wandell 1995), (ii) construing mediating processes (sensation: phys-
ical stimuli→ neural codes; abstraction: neural codes→ mental concepts;
interpretation: mental concepts → conscious percepts) as functors, (iii)
examining sensations (e.g. population coding, opponent coding) to see if
they can be construed as representable functors, (iv) examining mental
concepts to see if they can be construed as colimits of sensations, and (v)
examining the empirical relations between abstraction and interpretation
to see if they are characterized by adjointness. Extending functorial se-
mantics beyond mathematical knowing to account for ordinary cognition,
although monumental, is proposed as a pathway for the advancement of
the science of cognition.
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Appendices
A1. Category
Consider four neurons A, B, C, D, and three synapses f : A → B, g :
B→ C, h : C→ D between these neurons. We can compose two synapses
if the origin of the second synapse is the same as the destination of the
first, and obtain a synaptic path from the origin of the first synapse to
the destination of the second. The origin of g : B → C is same as the
destination of f : A → B, so we can compose them to obtain a path from
A to C: g ◦ f = A−f → B−g → C = A → C, where the composition
g ◦ f is read as “g after f”.
Next, for each neuron, there is an identity synaptic pathway with the
neuron as both origin and destination. For example, we have the identity
path 1A : A→ A on neuron A. The composition of paths between neurons
satisfies two identity laws: pre-composing any path f : A → B with the
identity path on its origin A gives the same path: f ◦ 1A = A − 1A →
A− f → B = A− f → B, and post-composing with the identity path on
its destination B gives the same path: 1B ◦ f = A− f → B− 1B → B =
A− f → B.
Furthermore, composition satisfies the associative law, i.e. given a
triple of composable paths: A − f → B − g → C − h → D, we can first
compose the paths f and g and then compose the composite path g ◦ f
with path h to obtain the composite h ◦ (g ◦ f). Alternatively, we can first
compose the paths g and h and then compose the composite path h ◦ g
with path f to obtain the composite (h ◦ g) ◦ f . Either way, we get the
same composite path from A to D, i.e. h ◦ (g ◦ f) = (h ◦ g) ◦ f = h ◦ g ◦ f :
A→ D. Thus, with the composition of paths satisfying both the identity
laws and the associative law, the neurons along with their synapses form
a mathematical category (Lawvere and Schanuel 2009, p. 21).
Now consider graphs and graph morphisms. A graph morphism f : X
→ Y is a way of placing the arrows and dots of the domain graph X on the
arrows and dots of the codomain graph Y without tearing apart the domain
graph (Lawvere and Schanuel 2009, pp. 141f, 210). For example, placing
the two arrows in graph X (of Fig. 2) on either one of the two arrows in
graph Y is a morphism, but placing the two arrows in X on two different
arrows in Y is not a morphism. When a graph X is modeled as a pair of
functions sx, tx : XA → XD assigning to each arrow in the set XA of arrows
of graph X its source, target dot in the set XD of dots (Fig. 4), a graph
morphism f : X→ Y is a pair of functions fA : XA → YA, fD : XD → YD
satisfying fD ◦ sx = sy ◦ fA and fD ◦ tx = ty ◦ fA, which ensures
preservation of source and target relations.
With graph morphisms thus defined, we find that the composite of
graph morphisms is a graph morphism. Given another morphism g :
Y → Z, i.e. a pair of functions gA : YA → ZA and gD : YD → ZD
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satisfying: gD ◦ sy = sz ◦ gA and gD ◦ ty = tz ◦ gA, we find that
g ◦ f : X → Z is a morphism, i.e. the composite functions gA ◦ fA :
XA → ZA and gD ◦ fD : XD → ZD satisfy: gD ◦ fD ◦ sx = sz ◦ gA ◦ fA
and gD ◦ fD ◦ tx = tz ◦ gA ◦ fA. Furthermore, composition of graph
morphisms satisfies both the identity laws and the associative law. Thus,
graphs and graph morphisms form a category.
A2. Functor
Consider the perception of light of different wavelengths as different
colors. As a first approximation, we can model perception as a function
(from a domain set of wavelengths to a codomain set of colors) assigning
a perceived color to each wavelength. However, note that in seeing colors,
sometimes large wavelength differences are mapped to small perceptual
differences (within a color category of, say, red), while small wavelength
differences are mapped to large differences in perception (across the color
categories of, say, red versus yellow). So, we need a mathematical con-
struct which not only maps elements (wavelengths) to elements (colors)
but also maps relations between wavelengths (physical differences) to re-
lations between colors (perceptual differences). The mathematical con-
struct of a functor, mapping objects to objects and relations between
objects (morphisms) to relations between objects (morphisms), does just
this (Lawvere and Schanuel 2009, p. 369). The notion of a functor be-
tween categories can be thought of as a generalization of the more familiar
notion of a function between sets.
To see the mathematical construct of a functor more clearly, consider
the process of translating text from one language into another. Based
on, say, looking at the Telugu-language meaning of English words in an
English → Telugu dictionary, we can think of translation as an assign-
ment of a Telugu-language word to a word in English language. Modeling
translation as a function
translation : wordsEnglish → wordsTelugu
(assigning an element in the codomain set wordsTelugu to each element in
the domain set wordsEnglish) is a first approximation. In addition to trans-
lating words, we also translate sentences to sentences. When translating
a sentence (e.g. “Sita married Rama”) in one language to a sentence in
another language we make sure that subjects (Sita) go to subjects and
objects (Rama) to objects. Thus we can summarize the process of trans-
lation as:
translation(subject(sentence)) = subject(translation(sentence))
translation(object(sentence)) = object(translation(sentence))
These equations state that the subject (object) of a translated sen-
tence is same as the translation of the subject (object) of the sentence.
178 Posina, Ghista and Roy
Oftentimes we combine two sentences into a sentence (apple is fruit and
fruit is edible → apple is edible), and translation is respectful of such
combinations. If we translate two sentences S and R (in a language L)
into S’ and R’ (in another language L’), then the combined sentence S +
R is translated as S’ + R’, i.e.
translation (S + R) = translation (S) + translation (R)
Additionally, if we imagine an identity sentence associated with every
word, i.e. for each word such as “fruit” we imagine an identity sentence
“fruit is fruit”, then the translation of an identity sentence is the same
as the identity sentence of the translated word. These requirements of
preserving the subject, object, composition, and identity structure in the
process of translation constitute the definition of a functor.
Formally, a covariant functor F : A → B assigns to each object A
and to each morphism f : A → A′ in the domain category A an ob-
ject F (A) and a morphism F (f) : F (A) → F (A′), respectively in the
codomain category B, such that identities and composites are preserved,
i.e. F (1A) = 1F(A) and F (g ◦ f) = F (g) ◦ F (f). Measurements of
graph properties, i.e. the dots functor D : G → S and the arrows func-
tor A : G → S are both covariant functors (Fig. 2). The dots functor
D : G → S assigns to each graph X in the category G of graphs its set
XD of dots in the category S of sets: D(X) = XD, and to each morphism
f : X → Y the function fD : XD → YD between the corresponding sets
of dots. Since the domain (codomain) of the set function fD to which
a graph morphism f is assigned is the value of the dots functor D at
the domain (codomain) of the graph morphism, the dots functor D is a
covariant functor.
A contravariant functor F : A → B assigns to each morphism f :
A → A′ in A a morphism F (f) : F (A′) → F (A) in B (in the opposite
direction), and satisfies F (g ◦ f) = F (f) ◦ F (g). A model of the graph
theory T is a contravariant functor M : T→ S interpreting the category
T into a background category S of sets. The category T consists of two
objects (dot D, arrow A), and two morphisms (s : D → A, t : D → A),
see Fig. 3. The functor M maps the two objects D, A to two sets: M(D)
= dots, M(A) = arrows, and the two morphisms s : D → A, t : D →
A to the two functions source : arrows → dots, target : arrows → dots
(Fig. 4). The domain (codomain) set of the function source : M(A) →
M(D), to which the graph morphism s : D → A is mapped, is the value
of the functor M at the codomain (domain) object of the morphism s :
D → A. The same is the case with the function target : M(A) → M(D)
to which the morphism t : D → A is mapped. Hence, model M : T→ S
is a contravariant functor.
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A3. Representable Functor
The basic idea underlying the mathematical construct of a repre-
sentable functor is that in certain cases it is possible to objectify processes
of measurement. The measurement of properties of elements of a set is of-
ten formalized as a function f : A→ B. For example, with A = {banana,
apple} and B = {green, yellow, red}, color : A→ B is a B-valued property
of A, where color(banana) = yellow and color(apple) = red. In a similar
way, measurements of properties of objects of a category A are formalized
as functors F : A→ B. If there is an object in the domain category of a
functor representing the functor, then the functor is representable.
We will now show that the dots functor D : G→ S, which assigns to
each graph X in the domain category G of graphs its set of dots XD in the
codomain category S of sets, is a representable functor. The dots functor
D : G → S is representable if there is a graph D in the domain category
G and an element d in the set D(D) of dots of the graph D, such that,
for any graph X, the function from the set XD (of all graph maps from D
to X) to the set D(X) = XD (of all dots of the graph X), which assigns to
each graph map x : D → X in the set XD the element D(x)(d) in the set
XD, is an isomorphism of sets (Lawvere and Rosebrugh 2003, pp. 248f).
Taking a single-dot graph as the graph D, with the only dot of the
graph D as the element d of the set D(D) of dots of the graph D, we
find that the function f : XD → XD assigning to each map x : D →
X the element D(x)(d) = x is an isomorphism. Since there is only one
dot in the graph D, a graph map x : D → X is a listing of a dot x in a
graph X. Also, for each dot x in a graph X, there is a graph map x : D
→ X with the dot x as its value at the only dot in the domain graph D.
Thus, graph maps from a single-dot graph D to the graph X are in one-
to-one correspondence with the dots of the graph X. Formally, functions
f : XD → XD (with f(x : D → X) = D(x)(d) = x) and g : XD → XD
(with g(x) = x : D → X) satisfy both: f ◦ g = 1XD and g ◦ f = 1XD
(since f ◦ g(x) = f(x : D → X) = x and g ◦ f(x : D → X) = g(x) = x :
D → X). Thus, the dots functor, assigning to each graph its set of dots,
is represented by the single-dot graph.
It can also be shown that the arrows functor A : G → S, assigning
to each graph X in G its set XA of arrows in the category S of sets, is
represented by a graph A consisting of one arrow (Figs. 2, 3). In the
category of functions, the two functions U : 0→ 1 and 1 : 1→ 1, where
0 = {} and 1 = {•}, represent the measurement of codomain and domain,
respectively, of functions (Fig. 5a). In the category of dynamical systems,
the dynamical system (N, n: N → N), where N = {0, 1, 2, ...} and n(n)
= n + 1, represents the measurement of the states of a dynamical system
(Fig. 5b; Lawvere and Schanuel 2009, pp. 177ff).
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A4. Adjointness
The notion of adjointness can be introduced in terms of an opposite
pair of sorting and exemplification processes between particulars and gen-
erals (Lawvere and Schanuel 2009, pp. 81ff). Consider two sets A = {cat,
dog, rose, lily}, B = {animal, flower}. A function f : A→ B, with f(cat)
= animal, f(dog) = animal, f(rose) = flower, and f(lily) = flower, is
a sorting of A. In the opposite direction, a function g : B → A, with
g(animal) = cat and g(flower) = rose is an exemplification of B. The two
functions f : A→ B and g : B→ A satisfy f ◦ g = 1B and g ◦ f = e (where
1B is the identity function on B and e is an idempotent endomap on A),
which formalizes the interdependence of sorting and exemplification: an
example of a general (animal) is one of the particulars (cat) mapped to
the general.
However, generals (animal, flower) and particulars (cat, dog, rose, lily)
are not discrete structureless elements but they are related to one another
in specific ways. So, the process of sorting is also a mapping of relations
(between particulars) to relations (between generals), while exemplifica-
tion is a mapping of relations in the opposite direction. Since a functor is
a mapping of relations to relations, a more accurate model of the oppo-
site processes of sorting and exemplification is an opposite pair of functors
between particulars and generals. This opposite pair of functors is also
constrained by the requirement that a particular sorted into a general is
an example of the general. In formalizing these constraints we find that
the relation between particulars and generals is an instance of adjointness
(Lawvere 2004, p. 8).
Adjoint functors can be discerned in all branches of mathematics
(MacLane 1998, pp. 107f). A simple example of adjointness involves the
transformation of a function of two variables into a function of one vari-
able, whose values are functions (MacLane 1965, p. 57). Consider a set of
numbers A = {4, 9}, a set of operations B = {√, ∧}, where √ and ∧ de-
note square root and squaring operations, respectively, and a set of values
C = {2, 3, 16, 81}. When operations in B are applied to the numbers in A
we get the values in C, which can be written as a function of two variables
i.e., f : A × B → C, with f(4,√) = 2, f(9,√) = 3, f(4, ∧) = 16, and
f(9, ∧) = 81. Corresponding to the two-variable function f : A× B→ C,
there is a one-variable function g : B → CA, whose values are functions;
CA is the set of all functions from A to C. The function g : B → CA
maps the square root operation
√
(in B) to the function mapping the
numbers 4 and 9 (in A) to the numbers 2 and 3 (in C), respectively, while
the squaring operation ∧ (in B) is mapped to the function mapping the
numbers 4 and 9 (in A) to the numbers 16 ans 81 (in C), respectively.
In the opposite direction, a one-variable function g : B → CA, whose
values are functions, determines a two-variable function f : A × B → C.
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This one-to-one correspondence between functions f : A× B→ C with a
product (A × B) as domain and functions g : B → CA with exponential
(CA) as codomain constitutes the adjointness between multiplication and
exponentiation functors (Lawvere and Rosebrugh 2003, p. 109).
Now we present a simplified version of the theory-model adjointness
(Lawvere 1972, pp. 139ff, Lawvere 2006) as an illustration of the cal-
culations involved in formalizing the interdependence of concepts and
percepts. Consider a theory construed as a category T. Models of the
theory T (in a background category S of sets) are contravariant functors
Top → S. The totality of these models constitutes a functor category
ST
op
, with functors Top → S as objects. The theory-model interdepen-
dence can be characterized in terms of an opposite pair of functors: ab-
straction A : ST
op → T and interpretation I : T → STop (Lawvere and
Rosebrugh 2003, pp. 249f). Let us take a category with one object T along
with its identity morphism 1T : T → T as a theory T. The opposite cat-
egory Top has the same objects as T, but with arrows reversed (Lawvere
and Rosebrugh 2003, p. 5). Since reversing the identity morphism results
in the same morphism, we have Top = T. So, functors X : T→ S (eval-
uated at the only object T and its identity morphism 1T of the category
T, i.e. X(T) = X and X(1T) = 1X) correspond to sets in S.
Thus, with theory T as a category with one morphism 1T, the category
of functors ST
op
corresponds to the category S of sets. With ST
op
= S,
interpretation I : T → S is right adjoint to abstraction A : S → T. The
functor A : S → T maps all sets (in S) to the only object T (in T) and
every function to the only morphism 1T. In the opposite direction, there
is a functor I : T→ S, whose value at the object T is the single-element
set 1, i.e. I(T) = 1 and I(1T) = 11. To show that the functor I : T→ S
is right adjoint to A : S→ T, we have to show that given an object T (in
T), every figure in T whose shape is a value of the functor A i.e. every
figure t : A(S) → T is in the figure eT : A(I(T)) → T , and that there
is only one function s : S → I(T) satisfying t = eT ◦ A(s) (Lawvere and
Schanuel 2009, pp. 374f). Since A(S) = T, and since there is only one
morphism 1T : T→T (in T), t = 1T, whose inclusion in eT : A(I(T))→ T
we have to characterize.
Since A(I(T)) = T, it follows that eT = 1T. Now we have to show
that there is only one function s : S → I(T) satisfying 1T = 1T ◦ A(s).
Note that I(T) = 1, and that there is only one function s : S → 1 from
any set S to the terminal set 1, and the only function s is mapped to 1T,
i.e. A(s) = 1T. So, we have to show that 1T = 1T ◦ 1T, which is given
by the identity laws defining a category. Thus, the interpretation functor
I : T→ STop is right adjoint to the abstraction functor A : STop → T.
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